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The late Gary Becker (1930-2014), winner of the presti-
gious Nobel Prize in Economics and the Presidential Medal 
of Freedom, was a theorist who developed explanations for 
common phenomena not normally associated with eco-
nomic inquiry. He analyzed drug addiction, crime, and 
family structure among many other topics. Of particular 
relevance to farm policy and the development of the Agri-
cultural Act of 2014 is Becker’s (1983) theory of political 
competition between rent-seeking pressure groups which 
predicts that policies that have enough political support to 
be adopted will tend to have two attributes. 
First, they have lower deadweight losses—an economic 
measure of the loss of economic efficiency—than compet-
ing policies because high deadweight losses increase the po-
litical advantage of opponents. Second, the chosen policies 
will be designed to allow them to be defended as providing 
public goods, as correcting externalities, or as increasing 
social welfare, broadly defined. Policies with this second at-
tribute create opportunities for public relations campaigns 
to deflect criticisms about wealth transfers from consumers 
and taxpayers to favored industries.
Leaders of the House and Senate agricultural commit-
tees introduced several new policies in the new farm bill, in-
cluding the new commodity title programs called Price Loss 
Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC), and 
the new crop insurance program called Supplemental Cover-
age Option (SCO). An examination of the likely deadweight 
losses from these policies along with the arguments put for-
ward by their supporters shows that Becker’s theory of com-
petition provides a useful framework for understanding why 
farm subsidies have been so resilient. 
Stated Rationale for New Farm Programs
Farm programs are largely written by House and Senate 
leadership with direct input from representatives of the 
beneficiaries of the programs. In addition to agricultural 
commodity group representatives, a relatively new benefi-
ciary of farm support is the crop insurance industry, which 
consists of insurance providers and crop insurance agents. 
Congress uses baseline budgeting procedures—an account-
ing approach to develop future cost estimates that uses the 
current spending level adjusted by forecasts of inflation and 
population changes. Hence, the problem facing this col-
laborative group was how to allocate a largely fixed budget 
among programs and commodities that the group could 
support internally without generating so much opposition 
from external forces that it could not pass Congress and be 
signed into law.
Early in the process of creating the new farm bill, Frank 
Lucas, chairman of the House Agriculture Committee (R-
OK) stated the rationale for farm programs as one of pro-
viding a necessary safety net: 
 “Along with crop insurance, Title I programs form the 
very fabric of our farm safety net. They ensure that dra-
matic swings in commodity prices and volatile weather 
don’t put our farmers and ranchers out of business.” 
Lucas went on to argue that taxpayers and consumers ben-
efit from farm programs because they insure an adequate 
food supply: 
 “While they (farmers) do the hard work of produc-
ing our food, we have to do our part to support them. 
Without a safety net, a few bad seasons can put a farm 
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out of business. When we lose 
that source of production, we 
don’t usually get it back. So maybe 
instead of speaking about this as a 
farm safety net, we need to start 
calling it a food safety net. Per-
haps that will get the message out 
that commodity support keeps 
farmers in business, which keeps 
food on our plates.” (Oklahoma 
Farm Report, 2011.)
Lucas’ framing of the rationale for 
farm programs was adopted by nearly 
all supporters of farm subsidies be-
cause it was easy to state, easy to un-
derstand, and argued that, because 
the public interest was being served, 
farm programs deserved taxpayer sup-
port. Becker’s theory focuses on how 
increasing deadweight losses from 
wealth transfers limit the equilibri-
um amount of transfer that will take 
place. The purpose in Lucas’ framing 
of farm programs was to make it ap-
pear that transfers to farmers actually 
increase social welfare in an attempt 
to neutralize political opposition mo-
tivated by the economic damage such 
transfers can cause.
Actual Deadweight Losses
Farm programs have the potential 
for generating significant deadweight 
losses in two ways. 
First, deadweight losses caused 
by inefficiencies in tax collection will 
occur even with lump-sum transfers. 
Assuming that the amount of money 
spent on farm programs was going to 
be spent on other programs and not 
used to reduce government outlays, 
the net increase in deadweight loss-
es from tax collection to fund farm 
programs is zero. If actual farm bill 
spending changes relative to projec-
tions, then so, too, will deadweight 
losses associated with collecting taxes. 
Second, within the crop-produc-
ing sector, a necessary condition for 
large deadweight losses is for farmers 
to significantly alter the mix of crops 
as a result of the incentives provided 
by the programs. Past experience with 
U.S. farm programs demonstrates 
that the mix of crops is significantly 
altered only if program payments 
are coupled with current planting 
decisions. Thus, the most important 
factor that determines whether farm 
programs have the potential for creat-
ing deadweight losses is whether the 
size of program payment varies with 
a farmer’s planted acreage. One ma-
jor discussion during the farm bill 
debates centered around whether 
subsidies should be paid based on the 
actual acres a farmer plants or instead 
on the farmer’s “base”—which are 
the historical planted acres of certain 
crops (Zulauf, 2013). 
 Becker’s theory predicts that, to 
reduce opposition to new farm pro-
grams, they would be designed to 
minimize deadweight losses by bas-
ing payments on base acres and base 
yields rather than actual planted 
acres. An examination of the three 
new programs for crops—PLC, 
ARC, and SCO—largely supports 
this prediction. 
Price Loss Coverage
PLC is basically the previous coun-
tercyclical payment program with a 
new name and higher trigger prices. 
Payments are triggered when the sea-
son-average market price is less than 
a crop’s reference price. The payment 
is equal to the product of 0.85 base 
acres of the covered commodity, the 
difference between the reference price 
and the effective price, and the pro-
gram payment yield for the covered 
commodity. The key feature of this 
program is that payments depend on 
base acres and base yields. Thus, they 
are “decoupled” from actual planted 
acreage and will have minimal impact 
on acreage decisions, hence minimal 
deadweight losses. Even though pay-
ments to a particular crop may be 
substantial if market prices fall below 
program reference prices, there is no 
reason to believe that farmers will re-
spond to large, anticipated payments 
for a particular crop by planting more 
because the amount of payment they 
receive will not be affected.
Agricultural Risk Coverage
ARC generates payments to farmers 
when per-acre actual market revenue 
falls below the ARC per-acre revenue 
guarantee. Growers have a choice of 
whether to calculate actual revenue 
and revenue guarantee on county 
yields or on farm yields. The key fea-
ture for ARC, in terms of it generat-
ing deadweight loss, is that payments 
are calculated using base acres as with 
PLC. Thus, an individual grower’s 
planting decision has no effect on the 
size of any payment. Hence, ARC 
payments will not cause significant 
deadweight losses within the agricul-
tural sector.
Supplemental Coverage Option 
SCO is a new crop insurance pro-
gram that makes payments if county 
revenue or yield falls below 86% of 
the SCO guarantee. Unlike PLC and 
ARC, SCO payments will be based 
on planted acres. Hence, they have 
the potential to distort planting de-
cisions and cause deadweight losses. 
However, two features of SCO make 
it unlikely that these losses will be 
significantly higher than they cur-
rently are with other crop insurance 
programs. First, prices that will be 
used to set SCO guarantees will be 
the same prices used to set other crop 
insurance guarantees. Crop insurance 
prices reflect current market condi-
tions at about the time that planting 
decisions are made. Thus, crop insur-
ance guarantees provide no incentive 
to plant a particular crop that is not 
already reflected in current market 
prices. Second, price or revenue must 
fall 14% before an SCO payment is 
received so, at planting, there is a rath-
er low probability that a payment will 
be received. An additional consider-
ation that limits deadweight losses is 
that because SCO provides coverage 
between 86% and the percent cover-
age level of a grower’s underlying crop 
3 CHOICES	 3rd	Quarter	2014	•	29(3)	
insurance, it is likely that many grow-
ers will substitute SCO coverage for 
their individual coverage level. Thus, 
even if crop insurance coverage causes 
deadweight losses, any net increase in 
deadweight losses from SCO should 
be negligible. 
During the farm bill negotiations 
within and between the House and 
Senate agriculture committees, there 
was a lot of discussion about whether 
PLC and ARC payments should be 
calculated using base acres or planted 
acres. The Lucas rationale for farm 
programs argues for planted acres be-
cause it is difficult to imagine design-
ing an effective safety net for soybean 
farmers who have wheat base if, for 
example, their payments are based on 
what happens to wheat. Arguments 
for base acres were made by groups 
concerned that farmers would oth-
erwise plant in response to govern-
ment prices rather than market pric-
es, thereby resulting in deadweight 
losses. The compromise solution was 
to allow farmers to update their base 
acres using recent past planting deci-
sions. This feature better aligned base 
acres to the crops actually planted on 
farms while keeping payments decou-
pled from current planting decisions. 
This compromise was consistent with 
Becker’s prediction that consideration 
of deadweight losses is likely to be im-
portant in determining which poli-
cies are adopted.
Resiliency of Farm Programs
Record crop income in recent years 
and subsequent record-high land pric-
es make it absurd to argue that crop 
subsidies are needed to maintain agri-
cultural production capabilities in the 
United States. And the argument that 
the food security of the United States 
depends on subsidizing production of 
crops is easily countered by the fact 
that 30% to 40% of U.S. corn pro-
duction is diverted to produce etha-
nol while about 50% of U.S. wheat 
production is sold in export markets. 
Yet these two arguments continue to 
be the primary justifications put forth 
for crop subsidies. 
The disconnect between a lack 
of an actual economic rationale for 
farm subsidies and their continued 
existence demonstrates that farm pro-
grams exist not because of a need to 
enhance social welfare but rather to 
meet the political objective of mem-
bers of Congress to care for a con-
stituency that lends them political 
support. Thus, it is not surprising that 
record farm income in the last five 
years had no real impact on the ques-
tion of whether farm subsidies would 
continue. Farm income levels have 
no impact on the benefit of subsidies 
to farmers and, hence, they have no 
impact on the political benefits to 
members of Congress to provide the 
subsidies. 
The outcome of the recent farm 
bill, in terms of what programs were 
adopted, coincides nicely with Beck-
er’s theory of political competition 
with its focus on deadweight losses. 
The newly adopted programs will not 
lead to a significant misallocation of 
resources because program payments 
are decoupled from planted acreage. 
This attribute helped defuse opposi-
tion to the programs because, in one 
sense, they do no economic harm.
Unlike in some previous farm 
bills, the most important welfare 
costs of farm subsidies in the Agri-
cultural Act of 2014 are not tradi-
tional deadweight losses, but rather 
the lost opportunity to use the funds 
for programs that unequivocally 
have the potential to increase social 
welfare. Examples include agricul-
tural research, agricultural pollution 
prevention, invasive species control, 
transportation infrastructure invest-
ments, increased food quality and 
food safety inspections, and nutri-
tion programs. But transferring funds 
from farm subsidies to these types of 
public goods will not happen without 
a dramatic increase in the political 
power of groups advocating for the 
public good, which is a daunting 
challenge, given the defuse nature of 
public good benefits and the highly 
targeted nature of the current subsidy 
programs to a relatively small number 
of farm households. 
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